Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),
because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting
forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.
Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies.
But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly
bodies. Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is
natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards
God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in
loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently
good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not
a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness."
I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in
his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition
of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than
a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether
we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of
which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude.
Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not
engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of
engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be
right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act,
because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will
has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the
St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.63, C.2.
Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of
a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for
instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding
officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas
there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the
condition of its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect
there can be evil in them.
Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural
operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their
nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action.
But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the
angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the
movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural
beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned
away by sinning.
Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-
will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing
adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance
or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The
adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate
act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of
passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his universal
judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there
can be no sin in the angel; because there are no passions in the
angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been
said above (Question 59, Article 4); nor, again, could any habit
inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of
free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to
proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin is only
on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on
the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding
the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not
presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the
things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned,